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When lawyers and judges converse in litigation, factual and legal analy-
sis typically takes center stage. Yet, when the legal conversation' turns to
the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,2 the ground shifts. Intuition
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Michael Budabin McQuown, Ethan Frechette, and the Nova Law Review staff for excellent
research assistance.
1. By legal conversation, I mean to encompass both the arguments made by lawyers in
litigation and the court's adjudication of those claims.
Although this essay focuses on litigation, similar questions arise regarding arguments
made in the legislative arena and in political discourse more generally. Kent Greenawalt
offers thoughtful explorations in two books, with a particular focus on the legitimacy of reli-
gious convictions in law-related political discourse. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); see also Kathleen M. McGraw, Manipulating Public Opinion
with Moral Justification, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 129 (1998) (observing the
effectiveness of moral claims in shaping public opinion and the difficulty of detecting decep-
tive use of these kinds of claims).
2. Actually, legal discussions rarely turn to questions specifically related to bisexuals.
See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 359
(2000).
Many of the points made in this essay are also relevant to legal conversations about
the rights of transgender individuals, although this essay's limited scope precludes develop-
ment of that analysis here. Likewise, many of the points here may be relevant to legal conver-
sations about abortion, where intuition and moral judgment have often similarly displaced
reasoned analysis. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court incorporated its own, non-evidence-based views about abortion's effect on
women in sustaining the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003." The Court wrote:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexception-
able to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained.... The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed.
Id. at 1634 (emphasis added). On the use of this type of argument in abortion jurisprudence
and political rhetoric, see Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and
the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, DUKE LJ. (forthcoming 2008).
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and morals rationales often displace evidence-based reasoning.' More spe-
cifically, arguments to limit the rights of lesbians and gay men tend to de-
pend explicitly on intuition,4 and sometimes morality,5 in ways that contem-
porary arguments to restrict the rights of other social groups6 rarely do.7
In addressing this dissonance, this essay has two central aims. The first
is simply to observe the disproportionate openness to arguments based on
intuition and morals in legal conversation regarding gay rights, particularly
in equal protection litigation The second is to consider some of the func-
3. Some commentators have described more generally a "gay exception" to constitu-
tional doctrine and family law rules. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation
and Accountability Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1633, 1710 & n.319 (2004)
(citing discussions identifying "gay exceptions" to the ordinary application of settled rules).
4. In this essay, I use the word intuition in its ordinary, dictionary-definition sense,
meaning a "knowing or sensing without the use of rational processes" or, put another way,
"[a] sense of something not evident or deducible." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 947 (3d ed. 1992). At later points in the essay, I also refer to "uan-
provable assumptions" to mean essentially the same thing. See infra note 51 and accompany-
ing text. The essential shared trait is the impossibility of marshalling support that would sat-
isfy ordinary evidentiary rules.
5. By morals-based justifications, I mean to include only rationales that rely explicitly
on morality as a justification for government action as distinct from the larger number of
arguments and analyses that may have morality-based underpinnings. A paradigmatic exam-
ple of the morals justifications I focus on here is Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the majority
relied on "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate... that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" to sustain Georgia's sodomy law. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court rejected this reasoning, holding that "'the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."' 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citation
omitted). Although we see less explicit reliance on morals rationales post-Lawrence, I include
reference to morals-based justifications in this essay both because they continue to appear in
some cases involving lesbians and gay men, and because they share many of the troubling
features that are associated with intuition-based arguments. For an example of morals-based
reasoning in a post-Lawrence case, see State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 375, 383 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that state interest in "prevent[ing] the gradual deterioration of... sexual mo-
rality" justified more burdensome age-of-consent rules for same-sex than different-sex cou-
ples). I have addressed morals-based justifications in greater detail elsewhere. See Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233 (2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications].
6. Asylum law context provides a useful definition of social group for the purposes of
this essay. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (defining
"particular social group" category to include individuals of "similar background, habits, or
social status") (citation omitted).
7. To be clear, the point here is a comparative one-that gay and lesbian rights cases
have a relatively high concentration of these arguments-and not a claim that these arguments
always appear in gay rights cases or never appear in other cases. Cf supra note 2.
8. Again, my focus here is on contexts in which intuitions play an explicit role in justi-
fying government action rather than on contexts where intuitions may underlie arguments or
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tions and consequences of intuition-based arguments in legal conversations
more generally. I concentrate primarily on intuition-based arguments be-
cause they are the focus of scholarly inquiry less often than morals argu-
ments, although I address morals-based arguments as well.
I begin by sketching the work that intuitions do in sexual orientation
cases. Against this backdrop, I propose that the explicit proffer of intuitions
and moral claims as rationales for government action in cases involving the
rights of lesbians and gay men, while pleasingly transparent, also raises trou-
bling problems for legal decision-makers. Finally, I offer some brief
thoughts as to why intuition- and morals-based arguments are so freely made
in connection with challenges to sexual orientation-based distinctions, when
references to similar intuitions and moral views would not typically appear in
conversations about other types of government action.
I.
Our first task is to consider the work of intuition rationales in sexual
orientation cases. Although any constitutional law student knows that the
rationales function in constitutional adjudication as justifications for gov-
ernment action, I discuss the background law here briefly to highlight the
contrast between the justifications offered in sexual orientation and other
types of cases.
The requirement that governments justify their acts arises everywhere in
constitutional law, whether the acts involve treatment of enemy combatants, 9
punishment of students for unfurling a "Bong Hits for Jesus" banner, ° or
anything in between. In the equal protection context, in particular, govern-
judicial reasoning but remain unmentioned. There is an extensive literature addressing ques-
tions of intuition and adjudication more generally. See, e.g., Chris Gunthrie et al., Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (2007) (proposing a model
"[s]upported by contemporary psychological research on the human mind and [the authors']
empirical evidence" which posits that "judges generally make intuitive decisions but some-
times override their intuition with deliberation"); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch'" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929)
(discussing the use of "hunches" in judicial decisionmaking); Richard A. Posner, The Role of
the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1049, 1063-68 (2006) (discussing "the
role of the personal, the emotional, and the intuitive" in judicial decisionmaking); R. George
Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1381, 1384
(2006) (concluding that "intuition is invariably central-whether overtly so or not-to the
process of arriving at a judicial outcome by any standard recognized means").
9. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2003).
10. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
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ments must legitimize their decisions to draw the challenged classifications."
Explanations for line-drawing must be given when courts are deciding, for
example, whether a public university can exclude women from admission 2
or whether the state can maintain different rules regarding involuntary insti-
tutionalization for people with mental retardation and mental illness.1 3
At this general level, equal protection's demand for justification of gov-
ernment action related to sexual orientation is, of course, no different. Ques-
tions regarding a government's authority to deny same-sex couples the right
to marry or to allow or forbid gay adults from adopting children, for exam-
ple, are all variations on the standard constitutional inquiry into a govern-
ment's authority to impose a limitation on the rights of some, but not others.
When these questions arise, standard principles of constitutional adjudi-
cation require us to look to the text of the Constitution's equal treatment
guarantees 14 and to cases interpreting that text. Most fundamentally, we ask
whether the government has supplied a good enough justification for its ac-
tion.'5 What qualifies as "good enough" depends on what the government is
doing and against whom it is acting. 6 Under current constitutional doctrine,
restricting rights based on a person's race or sex requires a fairly weighty
rationale."' By contrast, the hurdle a government must surmount before re-
11. In some circumstances, governments need not themselves produce the legitimizing
justification. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("[A] legislature that creates these
categories need not 'actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
classification."') (citation omitted). See also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
12. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
13. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 314-15.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Equal Protection Clause
is the central repository of constitutional equal treatment jurisprudence, cases applying due
process guarantees also frequently bear on equality questions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding due
process protections require pre-termination hearing for public assistance recipients), with
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (rejecting due process claim for re-termination
hearing for disability benefits recipients).
15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) (stating that
all legislation must, at a minimum, be "rationally related a legitimate state interest" and that
some legislative classifications call for heightened judicial scrutiny).
16. Elsewhere, I have argued that the traditional separation of equal protection review
into three distinct tiers serves as a barrier to equality and meaningful analysis. See generally
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 515 (2004) [hereinafter
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers].
17. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny
to law school's consideration of race in affirmative action plan); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33
(requiring the state to proffer an "exceedingly persuasive" interest to justify a sex-based clas-
sification); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (explaining that strict scrutiny applies to
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stricting the rights of most social group members, including the elderly, the
young, the disabled, and gay people, tends to be rather easier to overcome. 18
According to the weakest version of this review standard, any reasonably
conceivable justification will do.19
Ultimately, though, whether the standard is one of strict scrutiny or ra-
tional basis review, the bottom line question in any constitutional equal
treatment challenge is the same: Does the government have a permissible
justification for its action?"°
II.
It turns out, however, that although the core question regarding gov-
ernment rationales remains the same for classifications involving different
types of social groups, the conceptualization of "permissible" reasons-how
we think about which reasons are legitimate and sufficient and which are
not-often looks different in sexual orientation cases than in others.21
In the usual case, the government characterizes its restriction on an in-
dividual or group member as necessary to prevent a demonstrable harm. For
statutes "classif[ying] by race, alienage, or national origin" and that "heightened" scrutiny
applies to "classifications based on gender").
18. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21 (upholding a distinction between mentally ill
and mentally disabled individuals under rational basis review); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (sustaining mandatory retirement statute under rational basis review); cf
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (applying rational basis review to state consti-
tutional amendment that classified based on sexual orientation and invalidating the amend-
ment because animus, rather than a legitimate government interest, explained the state's dis-
tinction). But see In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999, 2008 WL 2051892, at *45 (Cal. May
15, 2008) (holding that sexual orientation-based classifications should be subjected to strict
scrutiny under the California Constitution's equal protection clause).
19. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ("[A] classification must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.") (internal quotation omitted). At times, however, even low-level,
rational basis review is applied with some degree of rigor. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620
(invalidating state amendment notwithstanding application of rational basis review); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-83 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that
criminal law imposing penalties on same-sex but not different-sex couples violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, supra note 16, at 514-17 (discussing
additional weight added to minimal rational basis requirements in some "strong" rational basis
cases).
20. See, e.g., Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, supra note 16, at 533.
21. For an illustrative list of cases in which courts have rested decisions in sexual orienta-
tion cases on intuition- or morals-based frameworks, see infra note 30. Again, I do not sug-
gest that this approach appears in all sexual orientation cases but instead that advocates and
courts that make arguments to sustain sexual orientation discrimination are unusually likely to
deploy this type of reasoning.
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example, the argument goes, national security depends on restricting the
rights of enemy combatants.22 Or a school argues that its educational mis-
sion will be undermined if it cannot punish the "bong hit" banner-waver.23
Simply put, the government identifies some demonstrable need that it aims to
serve by whatever action it has taken. A related premise of the argument is
that something particular about the burdened group--enemy combatants or
high school students in the illustrations here-justifies restricting members
of those groups but not others.
In the kinds of cases that we think of as classic individual rights cases
involving discrimination based on an aspect of individual identity, courts
also typically focus on a demonstrable fact about the group that justifies the
restriction on group members' rights. When the United States Supreme
Court sustained different involuntary institutionalization rules for people
with mental retardation and mental illness, for example, the Court cited fac-
tual differences between the two groups to support the differential treat-
ment.24 The Court similarly looked to the fact that only women can give
birth when considering whether to sustain immigration sponsorship rules that
are more onerous for fathers than mothers.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these "demonstrable fact" argu-
ments always succeed. For example, when Virginia argued that it could ex-
clude women from its military training institute because the school's adver-
sative training method was better suited to men than women, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument as flawed and impermissibly stereotyping.26 Nor
am I suggesting that the assertion of factual difference should be enough to
justify a state-sponsored classification. As Justice O'Connor observed in her
dissent in Nguyen v. INS, the fact that women can give birth to children can-
not, without more, explain why the government treats mothers as more likely
to inculcate American citizenship values than fathers.27
Whether or not we agree that these empirical distinctions justify a gov-
ernmental restriction in any particular case is not my concern here, however.
Instead, the point is simply that when a government seeks to restrict the
rights of one group of people relative to others, the focus tends to be on
whether demonstrable differences exist between the burdened group and
22. See Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
23. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
24. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-29.
25. Nguyen v. INS., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
26. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520-23, 558 (1996).
27. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 79-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32
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others sufficient to justify the burden being challenged. 8 So, returning to the
high school students and enemy combatants for a moment, the discussion
turns, at least in part, on demonstrable features or attributes associated with
the relevant population-whether it is a susceptibility to being distracted in
the case of high school students, or a heightened risk to the interests of the
United States thought to be posed by enemy combatants. The legal conver-
sation in these cases is about facts that are arguably related to the group and
about the connection between those facts and the need for the governmental
restriction.
When it comes to restrictions on the rights of lesbians and gay men,
however, the conversation and analysis tend to be different. The rationale
for the government treating gay people differently from others for purposes
of marriage, the military, adoption, or anything else is not, except in the out-
lier case, tied to a feature that makes gay people demonstrably different from
non-gay people. More specifically, the focus of courts and governments is
not typically on physical differences, educational differences, or differences
in mental health. Even the once-favored argument that gay people are more
likely than others to be sexual predators no longer gets much traction in legal
or, indeed, popular conversation.29
Instead of arguing that demonstrable differences exist, the claim, made
by both advocates and judges, is often that intuition or morality, or both in
some cases, are enough to justify treating gay people differently from every-
one else.3 ° Put most simply, the argument is that "our" shared intuition or
28. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Virginia, 518 U.S. at
533; see also Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (noting that the state "has proffered more than adequate
justifications for the differences in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill").
29. See Gregory M. Herek, Facts About Homosexuality and Child Molestation,
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts molestation.html (last visited June 3, 2008).
30. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d
804, 819-20 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (relying on "'unprovable assumptions"' about parenting to sus-
tain Florida's bar on gay adults from adopting children); State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 236
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that "the legislature could have reasonably determined that" an
age-of-consent statute that imposed greater punishment on same-sex than different-sex cou-
ples could help "prevent the gradual deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a major-
ity of Kansas") rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y.
2006) (relying on "[i]ntuition and experience" regarding childrearing to sustain the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage). In other cases where the language of intuition
and unprovable assumption is not used explicitly, courts have embraced rationales that rest on
similar intuitions. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plu-
rality opinion) (sustaining Washington's ban on same-sex couples' marrying in part because
"children tend to thrive" in a "'traditional' nuclear family") (emphasis added); cf Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999-1000 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (find-
ing the state legislature could have rationally concluded that "married opposite-sex parents"
7
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life experience shows that being gay is not as desirable, morally preferable,
or good for society as not being gay. These intuitions or moral commit-
ments, the argument concludes, suffice to support official distinctions be-
tween gay and non-gay people. Some describe this as "heteronormativity" to
convey the idea that the social norm is heterosexual and that anything other
than heterosexuality involves a non-neutral, negative deviation. 3'
While this intuition or preference for heterosexuality undoubtedly plays
a powerful role in social conversation among individuals and within many
communities, the aim here is to capture its role in legal conversation. So, we
might ask, if the government has to point to a difference between gay and
non-gay people to justify its sexual orientation-based distinctions between
constituents, what are the available options, other than intuition?
There's the rub, at least for government lawyers and courts that would
uphold these classifications. As just noted, unlike for some other social
groups, sexual orientation gives rise to no known differences in physical
capacity, intellectual ability, and mental health.32 There are also no credible
are "the optimal social structure in which to bear children" and that same-sex couples "pre-
sent[] an alternative structure for child rearing that has not yet proved itself').
31. Linda C. McClain, Some ABCs of Feminist Sex Education (in Light of the Sexuality
Critique of Legal Feminism), 15 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 74-75 (2006); see also Katherine
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
181, 184 (2001). For discussion of sex stereotyping embedded in some of these intuition-
based rationales, see generally Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent
Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007).
32. At one time, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric disorder among mental
health experts, but in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) voted unanimously to
remove homosexuality as a disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's (DSM)
section on Sexual Deviancy. John Gonsiorek, The Empirical Basis for the Demise of the
Illness Model of Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 116 (1991). A year later, a majority of the general APA membership confirmed this
decision, voting to replace the diagnosis with a milder category of sexual orientation
disturbance. The DSM-III, in turn, replaced this diagnosis with "ego-dystonic
homosexuality," which was deleted in 1986 in the DSM-III-R. Gregory M. Herek, Facts
About Homosexuality and Mental Health, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/
rainbow/html/factsmental health.html (last visited June 3, 2008). The APA now classifies
"persistent and marked distress about [one's] sexual orientation" under "Sexual Disorders Not
Otherwise Specified." AM. PSYCHIATRIC. Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 582 (4th ed. 2000).
This shift has been followed in many parts of the world, including the British Gov-
ernment in 1994, the Ministry of Health in the Russian Federation in 1999, and the Chinese
Society of Psychiatry in 2001. See Michael Kirby, The 1973 Deletion of Homosexuality as a
Psychiatric Disorder: 30 Years on, 37 AusTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 674, 675 (2003); Nigel
Warner, The Russian Federation Has Dropped "Homosexual Orientation" from Its New
Classification of Mental and Behaviour Disorders, ILGA EUROLETrER 75, Nov. 1999,
http://www.france.qrd.org/assocs/ilga/euroletter/75.html; John Balzano, Toward a Gay-
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studies showing that sexual orientation affects a person's ability to parent or
raise an emotionally and physically healthy child.33 Indeed, the American
Academy of Pediatrics has taken the position that sexual orientation is not a
relevant determinant of parenting ability, and has opposed governmental
distinctions between gay and non-gay parents and prospective parents.34
The dearth of factual evidence to support distinctions between gay and
non-gay people thus poses a challenge both for governments and courts that
would prefer to sustain sexual orientation-based distinctions, whether in mar-
riage, adoption, the military, or other contexts. What is a judge or govern-
ment lawyer to do? This is where arguments based on intuition and morality
come in-they fill the gap left by the absence of demonstrable and relevant
factual differences related to sexual orientation.
Consider for example, the Eleventh Circuit's decision sustaining Flor-
ida's ban on adoption by gay adults.35 Two rationales played a prominent
role. First, the court embraced Florida's contention that it could restrict
adoption to heterosexuals because "the marital family structure is more sta-
ble than other household arrangements. ' '36 And, second, the court agreed
with Florida "that children benefit from the presence of both a father and
mother in the home. 37
Turning first briefly to the marital stability point,38 two flaws bear not-
ing. For one, no reputable support exists for the court's proposition that mar-
Friendly China?: Legal Implications for Gays and Lesbians, 16 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 36
(2007). At the supranational level, the World Health Organization has not classified
homosexuality as a mental illness since the early 1990s. See WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES & RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS V
(10th rev. 2007), available at http://www.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icdl0online/.
33. See E.C. PERRIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT HEALTH 110-30
(2002) (reviewing studies and finding no material disparities in mental health and social ad-
justment between children of gay and non-gay parents); Melanie A. Gold et al., Children of
Gay or Lesbian Parents, 15 PEDIATRICS IN REv. 354, 357 (1994) ("There are no data to sug-
gest that children who have gay or lesbian parents are different in any aspects of psychologi-
cal, social, and sexual development from children in heterosexual families."); see also Brief
for Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Respondents at 36, Her-
nandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 86), 2006 WL 1930166; Brief for Child
Rights Orgs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1), 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598.
34. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Co-parent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Par-
ents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339 (2002).
35. Lofton I, 358 F.3d 804.
36. Id. at 819.
37. Id.
38. Although the court in Lofton I acknowledged the marital stability argument, it fo-
cused primarily on the mother/father claim. Id (describing the state's interest in "plac[ing]
adoptive children in homes that have both a mother and father" as more important).
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ied mothers and fathers have more stable relationships than partnered moth-
ers and mothers or fathers and fathers. All of the credible studies showing
the relative stability of marital relationships when children are in the home
encompass only heterosexual couples.39 At most, those studies demonstrate
that couples that have the option to marry and choose not to marry are less
likely to stay together than those that marry. However, for same-sex couples
that lack that option, studies comparing the duration of heterosexual relation-
ships do not provide accurate comparative information. Second, the marital
stability rationale begs the question whether the state can justify one dis-
criminatory rule, the adoption law, by pointing to another discriminatory
rule, the marriage law.4°
The Lofton court's disregard of the serious weaknesses in its reasoning
can be explained, I believe, by the court's strong sense-we can call it intui-
tion-that marriage really does hold families together, at least more so than
non-marital commitments. The power of that intuition led the court to disre-
gard both the facts and the law just mentioned, which, if given a fair hearing,
would have rendered the state's marital stability argument untenable.
The court's response to the state's childrearing rationale, which the
court characterized as even "[m]ore important[]",41 than the marital stability
claim, was even more misplaced as a result of the court's deference to intui-
tion. First, the constitutional question in the case was not, as the court put it,
whether children do well with a mother and father in the home.42 That de-
termination, which amounts to a choice among policy preferences, falls clas-
sically within the legislature's domain. Children, after all, do well with
many things: more money, better education, more loving, committed, and
capable parents.
The proper approach in this case would have been, instead, to apply the
run-of-the-mill equal protection inquiry to the classification at issue: Can the
39. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the
United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607 (2006); see also
Brief of the Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Conaway v. Deane, 903 A.2d 416 (Md. 2006) (No. 44) (mem.), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/27253g120061019.html; L.A. Kurdek, Are Gay and
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different from Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004).
40. Because this question does not bear on this essay's intuition-based argument point, I
will simply note it here rather than discussing it in full. For further discussion of this point,
see, for example, Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 247,252 (2007).
41. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 819.
42. See id. at 819-20.
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state legitimately choose sexual orientation as a basis on which to distinguish
between prospective adoptive parents?
If it were true, counterfactually, that sexual orientation was relevant to
parenting ability and that gay adults posed a particular danger to children, the
analysis would have been easy. The danger could have reasonably explained
the state's exclusion of gay people from the pool of prospective adoptive
parents. But because no factual support exists for the proposition that an
individual's sexual orientation correlates either positively or negatively with
parenting ability, the state and the court had to look elsewhere.
In the absence of persuasive facts, the state contended that children
"benefit" from the presence of a male and female parent, and the court ac-
cepted that argument as a sufficient justification for the adoption law's sex-
ual orientation-based line.43 And here lie the analytic errors. Most basically,
stating that different-sex parents confer a particular benefit does not, in itself,
show that same-sex parents do not confer either the same benefit or another
that is equally important."
But even if we infer, as intended by the state, that different-sex parents
provide a benefit not provided by same-sex parents,45 we have restated, but
not responded to, the equal protection inquiry. That is, the adoption law it-
self states that the government prefers adoptive parents to be heterosexual
rather than gay.46 Equal protection requires something more than repetition
of those preferences. Government must, at a minimum, have a legitimate
explanation for why it drew the challenged line.47 If it does not, equal protec-
tion review would be effectively meaningless because a state could always
justify its distinction between two groups of people by stating that group A
offers benefits that group B does not-or more simply, that it prefers group
A to group B and has, therefore, drawn a line between them.48 Something
more than mere reiteration of the classification is required.49
What, then, is the equal protection-sanctioned explanation for why Flor-
ida can constitutionally prefer straight adults to gay adults when deciding
who can adopt? The Eleventh Circuit sought to fill that gap, but lacking de-
monstrable evidence of differences between gay and non-gay parents, as
43. Id. at 819.
44. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't. of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton I), 377 F.3d 1275,
1297-1301 (11 th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
45. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 820.
46. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(c)(3) (2007); Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 806-07.
47. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (stating that classifications must "bear
a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end").
48. See id. at 632-33.
49. See id. at 632 (ruling that "the link between classification and objective gives sub-
stance to the Equal Protection Clause").
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noted above, it invoked intuition instead." The state's premise, the court
wrote, was "one of those 'unprovable assumptions' that nevertheless can
provide a legitimate basis for legislative action."'" It added that "[a]lthough
social theorists from Plato to Simone de Beauvoir have proposed alternative
childrearing arrangements, none has proven as enduring as the marital family
structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human
experience discovered a superior model., 52 "Against this 'sum of experi-
ence,"' the court concluded, "it is rational for Florida to conclude that it is in
the best interests of adoptive children, many of whom come from troubled
and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in a home anchored by both a father
and a mother."53
Before turning to the merits of this reasoning, I want first to make a
simple, descriptive observation. In most cases, as discussed earlier, parties
and courts do not rest decisions explicitly or exclusively on intuitions, un-
provable assumptions, moral judgments, or similar rationales that are not
susceptible to ordinary methods of proof. It is difficult even to imagine a
court opining that "we have no real evidence for limiting the rights of group
B-but we have our intuition, based on history, that limiting group B's rights
is rational and permissible." Or that "we have no evidence to show that the
relationships of A couples and B couples are different in their day-to-day
existence, but we know that there is a moral or commonsense difference be-
tween them, and that difference justifies granting more rights to A couples
than B couples." Yet, in Lofion v. Secretary of the Department of Children
and Family Services54 and numerous other sexual orientation-related cases,
55
the opposite is true. Courts in these cases proceed as though they are free
from the norms of legal conversation that lead them to offer evidence-based,
accessible reasoning in other kinds of cases.
50. Lofton I, 358 F.3d at 819-20.
51. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton to support the
"unprovable assumption" proposition. Id.; see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 62-63 (1973). Paris, however, did not rest its decision solely on "unprovable assump-
tions" but instead pointed to public safety and health rationales to support its ruling sustaining
Indiana's nude-dancing ban. 413 U.S. at 58, 61, 63 (referring to reports of"an arguable corre-
lation between obscene material and crime" and noting the "social interest in order," and
describing that interest as a concern with "antisocial behavior" that might flow from the "crass
commercial exploitation of sex"). For further discussion of the limitations of Paris Adult
Theatre I on this point, see generally Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications, supra note 5, at
1269-70.
52. Lofton I, 358 F.3d at 820 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. V, 459d-461e; SIMONE
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1949)).
53. Id. at 820 (quoting Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 63).
54. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d 804.
55. See supra note 30.
[Vol. 32
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/3
2008] INTUITION, MORALS, AND THE LEGAL CONVERSATION 535
My point is not that moral concerns, and unprovable assumptions and
intuitions are absent from government action and judicial reasoning. Surely
they are present regularly and perhaps even inevitably, at least to the extent
they shape individuals' capacity to understand and interpret information. 6
My point, instead, is that those concerns, assumptions, and intuitions are not
typically the major-and almost never the sole-stated factor in legal con-
versation about what a government can or cannot do. Yet, in cases involving
sexual orientation-based distinctions, we see that governments and courts
advance these types of reasons explicitly." This move begs the question
whether references to intuition or morals are constitutionally sufficient,
without more, to support state-sponsored distinctions between social groups.
III.
Even if we agree that moral commitments, intuitions, and unprovable
assumptions play an unusually strong role in legislative and judicial analysis
related to sexual orientation, we need not necessarily conclude that this role
should be cause for concern. Some would argue that the overt presence of
intuition- and morals-based arguments is the sign of a healthy decision-
making process, given what we know about how decision-makers use em-
pirical evidence to justify decisions that were really made based on intuitive
or moral priors.58 Indeed, the argument could be made that the legal conver-
sation around gay and lesbian rights should be emulated in other subject ar-
eas because it is more honest than most other public policy and law-related
conversations.
To take the point a step further, some would argue that reliance on intui-
tion is precisely within the domain of states. If the Constitution ties the gov-
ernment's hands from acting on intuitions or moral views about what is good
for the populace, some would say we disserve the state and its constituents.
Lord Devlin sought to shore up this point by maintaining that society would
56. For discussion of the ways in which cognitive biases shape information processing
more generally, see, for example, David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social
Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
188 (Mariano Tomassi & Kathryn leruli eds., 1995). Also see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995), for a review of the effects of cognitive biases on
individuals' interpretation of information.
57. See, e.g., Lofion I, 358 F.3d at 819-20.
58. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights,
Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006) (discussing
the ways in which courts rely on facts to stand in for normative judgments about social
groups).
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"disintegrate" if basic moral norms went unenforced. 9 In this vein, some
argue that if we do not allow the government to safeguard the populace's
moral well-being-by either reserving marriage to heterosexuals or barring
gay people from adopting-we are endangering our community's well-being
as much as if we prevent the government from developing licensing stan-
dards for teachers or punishing people who write graffiti on buildings, drive
through stop signs, or commit violent acts. How, these advocates might ask,
can we have a government that cares only about insuring our physical well-
being and protecting our property, when so much of what makes for a good
society is the society's moral health?
Yet, much as honesty might be desirable as general policy, honesty
alone does not convert intuition and moral commitments into credible legal
arguments. The problem, broadly put, is that rationales and decisions based
on intuitions and moral values are not contestable.6' Either you agree or you
do not, and even examples and evidence that undermine the proffered intui-
tion or moral position cannot provide conclusive disproof. When my morals
and intuitions are pitted against yours, what, really, can an adjudicator do?
One person's claim that her intuitions and moral commitments require Flor-
ida's legislature to bar same-sex couples from marriage leaves the decision-
maker with no more basis for a reasoned determination than another's asser-
tion that her moral commitments and intuitions mandate the converse result.
While this tension between competing intuitions and moral positions
may make for engaging social conversation, its centrality in legal conversa-
tions about gay and lesbian rights raises serious concerns for courts. Faced
with a government's intuition-based rationales and moral claims, courts have
three choices, none of which is ideal: 1) they can accept the assertions as
reflective of majoritarian sentiment; 2) they can accept the assertions because
they share them and find them to be correct; or 3) they can disagree with the
assertions and reject them.6' Yet embracing majoritarianism elides the im-
portant judicial screening function to insure that the intuitions are not merely
stand-ins for bias.62 And making independent judgments about the intui-
tions-whether for or against-runs the risk that courts will appear to be (or
actually will be) substituting their own preferences for those of the majority.
59. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965).
60. I develop this point at length in Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications, supra note 5.
61. An additional option might be to categorically reject any rationale that relies explic-
itly on intuition without considering the argument's merits.
62. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (stating that the obligation of courts
conducting equal protection review is to "ensure that classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law").
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Legal realists and critical theorists might say that this description does
no more than track the usual way in which outcome-oriented courts work.
But, even if that is the case, we ought still take note of the effect that open
reliance on intuition and morals has on the decision-making process.
In the usual case, we expect some evidentiary support to justify the
state's actions. We expect, for example, to hear about national security
needs, effective school disciplinary practices, public health, or sound educa-
tional or economic theory. Then, in our legal conversation, we can agree or
disagree with the proffered evidence by critiquing the methodology, the au-
thors' biases, or the analysis.
But, when ordinary norms of legal argument give way to intuition and
moral judgments, without even the expectation of demonstrable evidence, the
possibilities for rigorous contestation of the government's interests drop off
sharply. With this drop comes a substantially increased risk that courts will
substitute majoritarian preferences for meaningful legal analysis, and that
those in disagreement will be able to do little, at least in litigation, to over-
come the intuitions and moral judgments that have been deemed decisive.
IV.
Finally, two closing thoughts on why sexual orientation-related legal
conversations are so often dominated by intuition when others are not.
First, longstanding biases tend to remain strong even in the face of con-
travening evidence. To elaborate briefly, individuals who hold biases toward
a social group frequently see the disliked or feared group as deficient in some
demonstrable, factual way. Consider, for example, the demonization of Jews
in Nazi Germany and the dehumanization of African and African-American
slaves in the United States.63 Powerful cartoons and stories portrayed mem-
bers of those groups as sexual predators, disloyal, untrustworthy, and general
menaces to society.' 4 We can see this as well in depictions of lesbians and
gay men in the past century as mentally ill, sexually predatory, and otherwise
unfit to participate in society. 65 As the "facts" about Jews and African
Americans gave way in the face of reality, so too have the similar "facts"
63. See Colored Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1860, at 2; see also Anti-Jewish Boy-
cott Flares Up in Munich, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1935, at 9. For an overview of this topic, see
Jeffrey Herf, Ideologies in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on Nazi Germany and the
Pro-Slavery South (2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.yale.edu/glc/events/herf.pdf).
64. Herf, supra note 63.
65. See, e.g., EDMUND BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE, OR WAY OF LIFE? (1956).
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about lesbians and gay men-not everywhere, of course, but in many quar-
ters in the United States.66
This changed understanding of "facts," however, does not necessarily
result in the immediate eradication of bias. Instead, at least in some in-
stances, courts and legislatures permit intuitions, unprovable assumptions,
and even moral positions to do the justificatory work that was once accom-
plished by belief in the demonstrable deficiencies of the targeted group.
The current lack of credible facts to justify burdens on lesbians and gay
men thus helps explain the contemporary invocations of intuition and morals
by judges and lawyers who would sustain sexual orientation discrimination.
These intuitions and moral commitments are actually the residual-though
reframed-negative sentiments that were previously expressed as facts.
The second explanation for the relatively high concentration of intui-
tion-based arguments in sexual orientation matters is more particular to the
treatment of sexuality in society. Our own legal history shows Americans to
be-or at least to have been-especially anxious about sexuality and sexual
identity.67 Indeed, just as gay people were beginning to publicly demand
legal rights during the early 1970s, many governments responded by tighten-
ing prohibitions against sexual relations between same-sex partners.68 In
addition, even as popular sentiment was turning against laws that criminal-
ized the sexual relations of consenting adults, the Supreme Court concluded,
in 1986, that moral disapproval of homosexuality was sufficient to justify
Georgia's ban on oral and anal sex.69 Recall that the Court reached this con-
clusion notwithstanding a long line of its own cases reinforcing that the Con-
stitution's privacy and liberty guarantees protect individuals' most intimate,
formative decisions.7 °
Although the Court invalidated "sodomy" laws in 2003 as violating the
Constitution's liberty guarantee, 7' the nearly twenty-year survival of Bowers
66. By contrast, myths that are styled as facts about transgender people are only now, and
only in some communities, starting to be destabilized in this way. See generally Paisley Cur-
rah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle To Achieve Judicial And Leg-
islative Equality For Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000).
67. See generally PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND
COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000); DAVID J. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994).
See also Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and Its Consequences in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
America, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43, 44-45 (2007).
68. CAIN, supra note 67, at 36.
69. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
70. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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v. Hardwick72 in the wake of the sexual revolution, based on nothing more
than presumed moral judgments, sharply illustrates the way in which discom-
fort related to sexual orientation has influenced the course of legal conversa-
tion. It should not be surprising, then, in light of this pervasive discomfort,
that popular intuitions and moral commitments have played an especially
strong role in shaping sexual orientation law and policy when similar argu-
ments would have been disregarded in other regulatory contexts.
Once we recognize the particular leeway given to unprovable rationales,
we can then begin to ask whether legal conversation can and should tolerate
the relatively high concentration of intuition and morals-based rationales
associated with sexuality-related restrictions. I hope you will join me, per-
haps in my skepticism toward intuition as a sufficient rationale for govern-
ment action, but at least in asking whether intuition, moral claims, and un-
provable assumptions should be taken as seriously as they are in our contem-
porary legal conversations about the rights of lesbians and gay men.
72. 478 U.S. 186.
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